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APPROACH TO RELIABILITY
WHEN APPLYING NEW TECHNOLOGIES
John C. Bear, General Dynamics Corporation
(Pomona Division), Pomona, California
ABSTRACT
General principles derived from experience
in achieving high reliability in tactical
weapon systems are selectively summarized
for application to new technologies in
unusual environments
INTRODUCTION
The General Chairman of this meeting, in suggesting some
topics for this paper, observed that much of the technology
which is important in precise time and time interval appli-
cations is new and immature in the sense that it has not
been fully qualified for the most demanding field applica-
tions. Tactical weapon systems, while different in many
respects from PTTI applications, probably face similar risks
in achieving reliability in development. A supersonic
guided missile, for example, must cope with continuing
modernization of its state-of-the art sensors, oscillators,
and other special-purpose devices, and it must operate
reliably in severe environments including high and low
temperature, shock, and vibration. Perhaps some of the
lessons learned in the development of tactical weapons can
therefore be of value in PTTI applications.
PRINCIPLE NO. 1: START EARLY
During development the reliability of a design grows as the
sources of failure are unearthed and eliminated. In this
context reliability is more or less synonymous with matur-
ity, whereas state-of-the-art technology is by definition
infantile. It follows that any successful approach to the
problem will require an early start and an acceleration of
the normal processes for avoiding or removing the root
causes of failure (Figure 1).
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But many factors inhibit an early start. Cautious program
managers are reluctant to transfer funds allocated to the
downstream "curative" engineering into the category of
upstream "preventive" engineering. After all, testing is
certain to produce failures, whereas an analysis has only a
probability of payoff. Then too, managers who have grown up
under the heavy influence of Murphy's Law do not necessarily
believe that the really big failures are preventable.
Furthermore, state-of-the-art designs deal with arcane con-
cepts that do not easily yield to analysis nor readily
reveal their weaknesses. Also, the reliability experts do
not come from an ancient and universally admired discipline,
and their ministrations are not always trusted.
For these reasons, it is necessary to adopt a high-level,
deliberate, well-focused management determination to attack
unreliability at the beginning, to muster up a lot of
interest and excitement in specific approaches, and to
reward creative planning and successful effort. A good way
to converge quickly on a plan of action is to prepare a list
of the devices or design elements that are immature, and
identify for each item on the list a series of tasks that
will reduce the risk. What follows is a discussion of some
of the more useful tasks.
PRINCIPLE NO.2: KEEP IT SIMPLE
Complexity and sophistication, obviously, are the primary
obstacles to the achievement of reliability in the initial
design. On the other hand, a simple design (Figure 2) is
straightforward, well-balanced in its accomplishment of the
essential requirements, and free of frills—one might say
it is elegant in concept. But how. can simplicity be
achieved while striving for some new and difficult level of
performance?
An effective (but often neglected) procedure for achieving
a balanced design is the design trade study (Figure 3).
Its value lies in forcing alternative design solutions to
the surface, in clarifying the relative importance of
requirements (indeed providing the basis for deleting
requirements that are "costly" in one way or another), and
in suggesting back-up designs in case the primary selection
fails to prove out. The trade study technique adapts well
to the simulataneous analysis of multiple parameters (relia-
bility, weight, power consumption, cost, etc.) and is an
excellent mechanism for bringing design features and weak-
nesses out of the hallowed shadows of the expert mind.
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Another method for promoting simplicity, especially on
larger systems, is component standardization. The benefit,
of course, is reduced variability and thus fewer sources of
failure. But where a design applies redundancy as a way of
compensating for low reliability, one must beware of
standardization in the parallel components, for under severe
stress they will tend to suffer the same failure modes, thus
negating the assumed independence in the probabilistic model
that justifies the redundancy.
Another technique for achieving design simplicity is the
FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis). There are many
different ways to do an FMEA, and the scope of the analysis
can be adapted to designs of different sizes. In essence,
the object of the FMEA is to examine the dark side of the
design. The bright side, of course, is how it works or is
supposed to work, whereas the dark side is how it can fail
and what will be the consequences of failure. A good way to
perform the FMEA is with a team composed of the design
engineer, the systems engineer, and the reliability engineer.
Pooling their, different viewpoints can often lead to a
simplified design if they do the analysis early in the
development process when changes are still relatively easy
to incorporate.
PRINCIPLE NO. 3: MAKE IT STRONG
Assume now that an attempt has been made to simplify the
design, with a concentration of effort on the state-of-the-
art technologies that will dominate the failure rate of the
operating system. The final step is to take the resulting,
optimized design concept and make it strong enough to with-
stand its usage environment.
The general concept of conservative design (Figure 4) takes
the view point that environmental stress is the ultimate
cause of failure, so that failure prevention is a matter of
assuring adequate separation between expected strength and
expected stress.
To begin with, it is necessary to define the environments
with full respect for their lethality, with regard for not
only their average values, but also for their natural
variability and worst-case values. The design specification
must reflect these worst-case expectations.
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Then the strength objective is established, either in the
same specification or in formalized design guidelines.
Ideally the strength requirement will take the form of a
safety margin, which sets strength as a function of both its
average and its variance. Or, when the variance is not known
or is not a problem, the objective will take the form of a
safety factor (for mechanical designs) or a derating factor
(for electronic designs).
Finally, the strength-minus-stress difference is controlled
by analysis. That is, a stress analysis is performed on the
design before it is released so as to assure that the speci-
fications and guidelines have been followed. Even though
safety factors are as old as engineering itself, they suffer
de-emphasis whenever there is pressure to squeeze extra
performance out of a state-of-the-art device. The stress
analysis is essential, therefore, to enforce the guidelines,
to surface the risks, and to assure time for pursuing alter-
natives .
WHEN ALL THIS FAILS
If the foregoing approaches to preventive analysis do not
materialize for one reason or another, what then? The
standard fall-back position is to rely on testing, followed
by diagnosis and fixing of test failures so that they can't
recur. A very good technique for flushing out problems
early in the test program is the overstress screen
(Figure 5)). In applying this test, the high-risk devices
are exposed to one or more important environments to assure
that they individually exhibit an adequate strength-stress
.safety margin. The stress level should exceed the worst-
case expected stress in actual usage. The type of environ-
ment (s) should be tailored to the suspected weaknesses of
the device. The test should be performed as early as
possible, ideally by the designer or supplier. Proposals
for this kind of testing can evoke outspoken (and usually
unwarranted) fear of damage and wearout, which can be dis-
pelled by exploratory step-stress testing of dedicated or
spare hardware.
SUMMARY
The key to achieving reliability in new technologies is to
really want it--that is, to align the development team
toward the essentiality of reliability right at the begin-
ning. Given that significant attention will be devoted to
72
reliability early in the design phase, there are a number of
analytic tools such as trade studies and failure modes
analysis that will help keep the design simple, and others
such as derating and stress analysis that will help make it
strong. Further down stream, when hardware is available,
an environmental overstress screen in selected environments
will help expose remaining problems. In applying these
techniques success will be directly proportional to the care
with which they are tailored to fit the specific design
program.
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
DR. STOVER:
I would like to question you about the simplest design because it
seems to me that one of the most complex devices we do is the micro
processing. I am convinced that using it gives us more reliable
equipment then if you use the less complex method of achieving the
same result that it achieves. Yet that must be by far the most
complex device that we ever use in electronics.
The little tiny chip has so many parts on it, it can't be
looked at as the simplest approach. But gives us the smallest,
simplest project, the least soldering, the fewest connectors, they
are reliable products. They are appearing in our automobiles now.
I am sure the reason they are there is because they can't achieve
the same result as reliably by other methods.
MR. BEAR:
I think that is a simple development.
DR. STOVER:
You do?
MR. BEAR:
Yes, I do. I think that solid state, the programs of solid state
technology is moving toward simpler devices even though you count
the gates, it seems more complex. Yet the reliability is going up.
And the reason it is going up is that the more things are being
done mechanically without human intervention and that is primarily
the reason. We are doing more things in a systematic way and every-
time we go to a new grade of micro processors, you are not only
achieving a much higher performance, but we are also improving re-
liability. So I consider that to be simple.
DR. STOVER:
Well, I guess that your definition of simple needs to get around
through the industry because I am sure that the desgin engineer
who comes up with a circuit diagram that includes the circuits
that are on that micro chip and then comes up with all the firms
that don't use this micro chip, it is a much smaller circuit dia-
gram, much less on it and he gives that to his manager and which
one is the manager going to tell him is the least complex.
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MR. BEAR:
I guess my definition would be that simplicity is eliminating sources
of variability.
DR. STOVER:
How can you get the definition across to the rest of the world?
MR. BEAR:
I don't know. That is a good challenge.
DR. STOVER:
Thank you.
DR. WINKLER:
Thank you. I think we have some time to think about that and maybe
return to that question of simplicity. I think it is a very inter-
esting one since it appears to me that reliability engineering or
prevention of failure has very much to do with our ability to ratio-
nalize things, to think ahead your idea of putting the best brains
together into a review group and design group as early as possible.
I think that would be the best way to attack that failure to be able
to foresee.
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